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DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL DEBT:

TILE DOOMED QUEST FOR EQUAL TREATMENT
ANNA GELPERN & BRAD SETSER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Equality" has the ring of a basic value, an incontrovertible virtue. In
international finance, equal treatment is enshrined in treaties and
contracts.' Of all the equal treatment aspirations in finance, none
seems more essential to a lawyer than equal treatment of creditors
holding identical legal instruments: if one is to suffer a default, surely
so should the others; restructuring options available to one must be
open to all without regard to the creditor's identity. 2 Yet in the world of
sovereign debt, local and foreign investors buying the same paper
rarely achieve what anyone would recognize as equal treatment.
Until recently, governments borrowed from domestic residents and
foreign investors using very different instruments. Residents bought
"domestic debt"-paper denominated in local currency and governed
by domestic law. Foreign investors preferred "external debt," which
offered foreign currency and foreign law.
Because there was virtually no overlap between resident and nonresident holdings, it mattered little that lawyers and economists defined
domestic and external debt differently: lawyers focused on features
such as governing law and jurisdiction, economists on the holder's
residence and currency of denomination. The legal and economic
definitions of domestic and external debt were effectively bundled:
"domestic debt" meant local-currency, local-law instruments held by
local residents; "external debt" meant foreign-currency, foreign-law

* Anna Gelpern is a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for International Economics. Brad Setser
is a Research Associate with the Global Economic Governance Center, University College, Oxford.
We are grateful to G. Mitu Gulati, Edwin M. Truman, and David Skeel for their helpful comments.
We would also like to thank the Council on Foreign Relations and the Global Economic
Governance Programme, University College, Oxford, for their generous research support.
1. National Treatment/Most Favored Nation provisions in bilateral investment treaties and
paripassu clauses in debt contracts are among the examples. See, e.g., Bureau of Economic and
Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State, U.S. BilateralInvestment Treaty Program (July 1, 2003),
availableat http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/22422.htm; Lee C. Buchheit &Jeremiah Pam, The
Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2004).
2. For example, under U.S. bankruptcy law, claims must be classified according to their legal
character, not the identity of the holder. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRuPrcy
1122.03[31 (Alan N.
Resnick & HenryJ. Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2004).
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instruments held by foreign investors. In the end, lawyers and economists spoke of the same instruments.
This has changed since governments have loosened restrictions on
international capital flows. In liberalized, global capital markets, foreigners now routinely invest in local-currency, domestic-law debt, and
residents often dominate international sovereign bond issues.3 With
these changes, the legal and economic definitions of domestic and
external debt have unbundled. Today, a lawyer's domestic bond-one
that is governed by local law-may well look like external debt to an
economist, because it is denominated in foreign currency and/or held
by an offshore fund. Even more common, a lawyer's external bond
-one that is governed by foreign law-looks like domestic debt to an
economist, because it is held by a bank or other local financial
institution.
This change in the pattern of sovereign borrowing demands a new
way of framing the core issues that arise in a financial crisis. Most
existing approaches focus disproportionately on one set of legal instruments: foreign-currency sovereign bonds governed by foreign law.4
Our essay suggests that this focus is misplaced. It is the product of an
analytic prism that no longer reflects reality well enough to offer a
useful guide to crisis management. Expanding the inquiry beyond
foreign-law bonds reveals debt structures whose composition and legal
characteristics can change quickly under stress, largely at the discretion
of the sovereign debtors. Sovereigns appear to have ample space to
treat different creditor groups differently based on who they are, rather
than the legal instruments that had defined the debtor-creditor relationship in good times. We argue that despite important concerns about
inter-creditor equity, the ability to treat domestic and foreign creditors
differently is a necessary policy option for governments in financial
crisis. Recognizing this fact and the range of debt management tools
available to governments in crisis should also help creditors evaluate

3. The case studies in this Essay illustrate the broader phenomenon: foreign investors were
significant holders of Russia's domestic treasury bills, and local residents held nearly half of
Argentina's bonded external debt.
4. SeeAnna Gelpern, Beyond Balancingthe Interests of CreditorsandDevelopingStates, 97 AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. PRoc. 221 (2003); Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, Improving the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Process: Problems in Restructuring,Proposed Solutions, and a Roadmap for Reform 2 (2003), at http://
www.iie.com/publications/papers/roubini-setser03O3.pdf, Anna Gelpern, For Richer, For Poorer:
Sovereign Debt Contracts in Crisis,J. INT'L BANKING REG. 23 & nn.4-8 (2000). In particular, domestic
law debt has rarely merited international policy attention. See, e.g., Int'l Monetary Fund, Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanism-Further Considerations 12-19 (Aug. 14, 2002) [hereinafter IMF,
Sovereign Debt], available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/081402.htm.
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and manage the risks of investing in sovereign debt.
We illustrate our argument with three case studies. We use the
example of Russia's 1998 default to show that default on domestic-law,
domestic-currency debt in a relatively small market can trigger global
financial turmoil. We then examine the case of Argentina to show how
countries in financial trouble transform their debt stocks to enable
different treatment of domestic and foreign residents. In the last
section, we recount Turkey's decision to forego involuntary debt
restructuring in an effort to protect domestic banks, which had held
most of its domestic-law and a substantial fraction of its external-law
sovereign debt. In the conclusion, we touch on Uruguay's recent debt
restructuring as a rare example of equal treatment, made possible by
the relatively generous financial terms of the operation.
These examples hold two practical lessons. First, neither the legal
nor the economic perspective on domestic and external debt alone is
sufficient to explain or forecast government actions in crisis. All of our
case studies suggest that when a government runs out of money, it often
treats domestic and foreign creditors differently. Governments rarely
allow the legal features of their instruments to drive core restructuring
decisions. The desire to limit legal liability is one of many government
concerns, and rarely the dominant one. The desire to curry favor with
powerful political groups, to avoid a bank run, to stem the outflow of
foreign exchange, or to preserve access to future financing may drive
government policy.
The second lesson is that risk assessment and crisis response must be
based on a comprehensive and dynamic view of a country's debt stock.
The legal composition of a sovereign's debt is increasingly fluid, as
targeted debt exchanges can quickly transform the country's debt. In
crisis, such exchanges can help the sovereign segment its creditors into
different groups, making it easier to treat each group differently.
Ex-ante risk management must reflect this new, dynamic, and flexible
character of sovereign borrowing. For example, it would be a mistake
to assume that all of a sovereign's foreign-law debt will be treated alike
in distress. Moreover, the effective status of a single obligation relative
to others could change several times in its lifetime as the sovereign
dilutes, elevates, and subordinates instruments to suit. Ex-post crisis
management strategies must also presume fundamental flexibility. It will
be harder and harder to assume that domestic debt (however defined)
can be ignored or treated wholly apart from other kinds of debt. The
recent growth in the local-law, local-currency, and locally held debt of
many emerging economies suggests that fewer and fewer countries will
be able to overcome a financial crisis by focusing on foreign-law bonds
2004]
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to the exclusion of all other paper. Preventing and managing financial
crises against this background must involve the full spectrum of a
country's liabilities. This approach is closer to firm bankruptcy than to
a traditional sovereign restructuring.
Beyond these two lessons, we find little cause for alarm in the recent
blurring of the line between domestic and external sovereign debt, or
even in the continued discrimination between resident and nonresident creditors. Liberalization of international capital flows allows
domestic and foreign residents to hold the same legal instruments and
invest in the currencies of their choice, necessarily supplanting old
bundled definitions of domestic and external debt. Yet liberalization
has not transformed the international capital markets into a larger
version of a domestic market. Most obviously, for as long as there are
national governments, 'residents and non-residents will strike fundamentally different political and economic bargains with the borrowing
country, even as their capital is relatively free to move about. In
addition to debt repayment, residents look to their governments for
physical and economic security, basic services, and political stability.
The sovereign debt instruments they hold will be poor proxies for their
5
stake in the country.

There are two ways of dealing with this predicament in crisis. One is a
sovereign bankruptcy regime that is capable of assessing and enforcing
equal treatment among identical instruments. 6 But this is not necessarily desirable. Domestic firm or bank insolvency unfolds in the context
of a social safety net-including, for example, unemployment and
deposit insurance-to address the impact of economic failure on
stakeholders whose interests in the failed enterprise are not adequately
described by the instruments they hold.7 The prospect of a sovereign
bankruptcy regime complete with enforcement authority is distant at
best; 8 no one has even mooted a matching social safety net. The

alternative is the status quo-allowing national governments to address
the impact of a financial crisis on different stakeholders ad hoc in ways
5. See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J 1159, 1162-63 (2004). This is also true to some extent in domestic
insolvency-for example, the case of employee shareholders, whose economic stake in the firm is
different from those of other shareholders.
6. See Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign
BankruptcyFramework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763 (2004).
7. Firm bankruptcy in a modern economy is embedded in institutions that support stakeholders released by the bankrupt firm, including workers and depositors.
8. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, Discretion, and Authority in International FinancialReform, 4
J. IN 'L ECON. L. 613, 633 (2001).
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they see fit. Sometimes this involves discrimination among identical
instruments; at other times, equal treatment of identical instruments
followed by additional compensation to some holders (for example,
bank recapitalization). The costs and benefits of each strategy to the
country and the international financial system are highly case-specific.
II.

HEDGE FUND AND SBERBANK: DOMESTIC DEBT DEFAULT BRINGS ON

GLOBAL CALAMITY

Until recently, it was reasonable for the international community to
regard domestic debt, understood to be locally held, denominated in
local currency, and governed by local law, to be none of its business. It
was difficult to imagine such debt having effects beyond the borrowing
country's borders, let alone causing global instability. This impression
rested on the understanding that sovereigns could freely expropriate
their own citizens using state powers to print money and promulgate
and enforce laws. 9 If a government ran short of funds to pay the
domestic debt, it was expected to print enough currency to pay, or to
restructure the debt unilaterally by law or fiat (assuming a docile
domestic judiciary that would uphold the executive's restructuring
decision). Regardless, most market participants, scholars, and policymakers acted as if governments could be counted upon to contain the
domestic debt problem within their domain. °
The spectacular fallout from Russia's domestic debt default in 1998
showed the inadequacy of this assumption in today's capital markets.1
In the mid-1990s, Russia began issuing short-term ruble-denominated
treasury securities governed by Russian law, known by their Russian
acronym as the GKOs. The government then embarked on one of the
largest borrowing sprees in recent history to finance growing budget
deficits.1 2 Having overcome a bout of hyperinflation, Russia was no
longer willing to print rubles and resorted instead to printing ruble-

9. LEX REIFFEL, RESTRUcTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD Hoc MACHINERY 16 (2000).

10. See IMF, Sovereign Debt, supra note 4, at 13-14; LEE C. BUCHHEIT, HOW TO NEGOTIATE
EUROCURRENCY LOAN AGREEMENTS 79 (2000); ANTHONY C. GOOCH & LINDA B. KLEIN, ANNOTATED

SAMPLE REVOLVING CREDIT AGREEMENT 39 (Roberto G. MacLean &Jeswald W. Salacuse eds., 1994).
11. The Mexican crisis of 1994-1995 involved tesobonos-localaw, local-currency, dollarindexed instruments held by domestic and foreign investors. However, thanks to the rescue
package from the international community, led by the United States, Mexico did not default on its
debt.
12. Int'l Monetary Fund, Russian Federation:Recent Economic Developments, IMF Staff Country
Report No. 99/100, at 15, 18, 22 (Sept. 1999) [hereinafter IMF, Russian Federation], available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/1999/cr99100.pdf.
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denominated promises to pay. The promises were sold first to domestic
investors and later to foreign investors. ByJune 1998, the outstanding
stock of GKOs and their longer-term counterparts, OFZs, was over $70
billion1 3 with as much as 40% held by non-residents and the balance
dominated by Russian banks. 1 4 The largest single portion was held by
Sberbank, the mammoth Soviet-era institution that continued to take
in the bulk of Russia's retail deposits.1 5 Within a month, the stock
dwindled to $49 billion as investors cashed out or exchanged GKOs
and OFZs for Eurobonds in anticipation of default. 16 Foreign residents
now held about 30% of this total.' 7 In 1998, Russia also had outstanding over $10 billion dollars in longer-term dollar-denominated securities governed by Russian law, known as MinFins.' 8 A large portion of
the MinFins was held by foreigners. Foreign-law debt included $16
billion in medium-term Eurobonds, most of which were governed by
English law, denominated in U.S. dollars, and held by foreigners; just
under $30 billion in debts to foreign commercial banks (London
Club), much of which had been securitized and sold to international
investors; approximately $60 billion in obligations to foreign governments (Paris Club and others); $26 billion in multilateral credits; and
several billion dollars in private supplier credits.' 9
The GKOs were an attractive investment for foreign creditors. With

13. Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Review: InternationalBanking and Financial
MarketDevelopments, Nov. 1998, Statistical Annex at 77, tbl. 17, availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/

r_qa9811 .pdf.
14. William Tompson, The Bank of Russia and the 1998 Rouble Crisis 8-9, in ANATOMY OF THE
1998 RUSSIAN CRISIS (Vladimir Tikhomirov ed., 1999). On Russian bank participation, see for
example Federico Sturzenegger, Default Episodes in the 90s: Factbook, Toolkit and Preliminary
Lessons 23 (June 2003), at http://www.nber.org/-confer/2003/iases03/sturzenegger.pdf.
15. Catherine Belton, Sberbank's Audit Delays Increase Concern, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Russia),
Oct. 15, 1999, available at http://www.sptimesrussia.com/archive/times/509/news/b-sberbank.htm.
16. NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? RESPONDING TO FINANciAL CRISES
IN EMERGING ECONOMIES app. at 383-389 (2004) [hereinafter ROUBINI & SETSER, BAILOUTS].

17. According to the Russian finance ministry, foreign investors held 32% of the GKO/OFZ
stock at August 17, 1998. RUSSIAN FEDERATION, OFFERING CIRCULAR 108 (July 18, 2000) (on file with
authors). Foreign investors' GKO holdings had declined substantially and disproportionately
between June and August because they were successfully targeted in the July 1998 exchange of
GKOs for Eurobonds. See Tompson, supra note 14, at 8. Roubini and Setser offer an even lower

estimate of foreign participation on the eve of the default. ROUBINI & SETSER, BAILOUTS, supra note
16, at 149-50, 385.
18. RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 17, at 100.

19. Id.
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average yields of 60% in May-June of 1998,20 the GKOs promised a
spectacular return so long as the ruble remained pegged to the dollar.
However, such returns implied enormous risk and put a premium on
getting out before the market crashed. With falling oil prices, rising
deficits, political turmoil, and growing doubts about Russia's ability to
adopt the policies needed to repay its debts in full, annual interest rates
on the GKOs rose above 100%.21 The market's increasing doubts about
Russia's capacity to repay did not stop many from continuing to lend,
possibly on the assumption that Russia's strategic importance guaranteed a rescue package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and major Western powers should something go wrong.
On August 17, 1998, the ride ended abruptly when Russia defaulted
on the GKOs and the OFZs and let the ruble slide. The few billion
dollars in foreign holdings of Russian Treasuries was a tiny drop in the
global capital markets. Even if the GKO/OFZ default signaled a high
probability of default on the MinFins, the Eurobonds, and the London
Club debt (about $60 billion combined), the total amount of debt
directly affected was modest relative to the multi-trillion dollar global
markets.

22

Losses in Russia alone would be far too small to devastate

any fully diversified global investor.
The Russian default nonetheless shook the markets for two reasons.
First, many of the investors in Russia's debt were unregulated hedge
funds that had borrowed vast sums of money to make their investments.
Managing Russia's default for them involved unwinding an enormous
web of financial arrangements often with far-flung counterparts. Second, the government's debt default and Russian banks' default on
contracts designed to shield investors from ruble depreciation 2 3 exposed the downside of certain complex risk management strategies.
These strategies failed because, despite fancy financial engineering,
their performance ultimately hinged on the willingness and ability of
local actors in crisis economies to make good on their promises.
Among the foreign investors stuck holding the bag was Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM), a Connecticut-based hedge fund that
had borrowed upwards of $120 billion on a capital base of under $5

20. Id. at 108; IMF, Russian Federation, supra note 12, at 22. GKO yields approached 200% in
July and 300% in August. Yields on major industrialized country debt were in the single digits at

the time. Id.
21. Tompson, supra note 14, at 8.
22. See RussAN FEDERATION, supra note 17, at 100.
23. Sturzenegger, supra note 14, at 22.
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billion.2 4 It used the borrowed money to bet on market movements that
turned out to be extremely risky. Including thousands of derivative
contracts that had linked it with most major Wall Street institutions,
LTCM had accumulated more than $1 trillion of exposure, most of it to
the world's largest industrialized economies. 25 LTCM had only a small
fraction of its portfolio in GKO trades, which were hedged with bets on
the ruble. The bets fell through because LTCM's counterparties,
Russian banks, had effectively shut down cross-border operations when
the Russian government defaulted.
For LTCM and others, the effects of Russia's default went far beyond
their GKO holdings, triggering a worldwide sell-off of risky securities
and a mad scramble into the most liquid of U.S. Treasury bonds.
Investors who had bought on margin-with money they did not
have-had to sell good assets for cash to meet margin calls on assets
such as the GKOs that had lost most of their value. As creditors called in
loans, leveraged investors remained under pressure to sell in bad
market conditions, compounding the market turmoil that was pushing
them to the brink. All this activity led to enormous, unanticipated price
movements in a vast range of emerging and mature financial markets,
many of which seemed to have little in common.2 6 Global financial
markets went into a tailspin, threatening pervasive loss of liquidity and
economic collapse.
To stop the panic, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates, and on
October 3 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York facilitated a rescue of
LTCM by its creditors. By the time the New York Fed stepped in, the
fund's capital had shrunk to a mere $500 million, not enough to
support its trillion-dollar portfolio. A further loss of half a percentage
point on the firm's total assets-to be expected in turbulent marketswould wipe out LTCM's remaining capital.
A month later, in November 1998, Russia offered cash and new
longer-term instruments in exchange for the GKOs and OFZs. In
theory, the same offer was open to all investors with a few minor
exceptions. 2 7 But unlike domestic residents, foreigners had to deposit
all proceeds in restricted accounts, which could be used to buy small

24. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANcIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE

LESSONS OF LONc.TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 12 (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter HEDGE FUND WORKING
GROUP REPORT].
25. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED, at xix (2000); see HEDGE FUND WORKING GROUP
REPORT, supra note 24, at 11-12.

26. See HEDGE FUND WORKING

GROUP REPORT, supra note 24, at

12.

27. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
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amounts of dollars at special auctions. In effect, the Russian government prevented non-residents from converting the meager exchange
proceeds into foreign currency and taking them abroad.28 In addition
to default and restructuring, government restrictions on capital flows
prevented Russian banks from performing on their hedge contracts
with foreign investors. 29 As noted earlier, foreigners had entered these
contracts as a form of insurance against default. Their collapse contributed to the undoing of some hedge funds and big losses by global
financial institutions.
Despite the government's professions of equal treatment for all
investors, Russian banks that had dominated the local market and
Russian depositors that had invested in the defaulted securities indirectly through the banking system fared much better than the foreigners. Sberbank reported unloading a large portion of its GKOs and OFZs
in exchange for dollar-denominated bonds by early 1999.30 In a secret
side deal, several Russian commercial banks exchanged their worthless
GKOs and OFZs for new liquid Central Bank paper (the KBOs). 3
Some Russian institutional investors got more cash in the exchange,
while socially important holders such as individuals, media, and insurance funds escaped restructuring altogether.3 2 Many deposits were
transferred from shaky commercial banks to Sberbank and were paid
in full.3 3 Finally, some domestic investors were able to get rubles for

their GKOs and then use the rubles to buy dollars.
At the time of the default, Russia considered several choices that
might have been more favorable to foreigners. For example, some in
the government had argued for a drastic devaluation without default.
However, the authorities concluded that printing enough money to
service the GKOs would result in hyperinflation, devastating the domestic population that had seen hyperinflation eat up its savings only a few
years before.3 4 Another possible alternative was scrupulous formal
equality in restructuring and no special treatment for Sberbank or

28. See RuSsLN FEDERATION, supranote 17, at 108-09.
29. Sturzenegger, supra note 14, at 23. Note that the banks would have likely defaulted on the
hedges even without government interference, because they would have gone bankrupt as a result
of the GKO default and economic collapse.
30. Belton, supra note 15.

31. Tompson, supra note 14, at 12-13; Sturzenegger, supra note 14, at 23.
32. RUSStAN FEDERATION, supra note 17, at 109.

33. See Tompson, supra note 14, at 8; Sturzenegger, supra note 14, at 24; IMF, Russian
Federation,supra note 12, at 86.
34. Interview with Hon. Sergei Dubinin, former Governor, Central Bank of Russia, in
Oxford, Eng. (Apr. 30, 2004); CHRYSTIA FREELAND, SALE OF THE CENrvRy 317-18 (2004).
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other domestic holders. Again, the decision tilted in favor of protecting
the well-connected as well as the average Russian. Many Russians kept
their money in dollars and under the mattress, a result of Russia's
spotty banking history. 3 5 Those that had put savings in banks overwhelmingly chose Sberbank, an established, state-owned institution with a
nationwide network of retail outlets. Wiping out the people's savings
along with the hedge funds' investments was not politically viable. The
government might have achieved the same economic effect with more
legal integrity, by restructuring all GKOs and OFZs on the same terms
while injecting public capital in Sberbank to cover the resulting losses
and back deposits. Domestic depositors would have taken smaller
aggregate losses as a result of a bank bailout.3 6 One can only guess that
the exigencies of the crisis made the two-step approach impractical.
Few could have predicted that Russia's economy (barely the size of
the Netherlands') and its tiny ruble debt market (a speck relative to the
multi-trillion dollar U.S. Treasury market and a fraction of Brazil's local
market) would trigger a global crisis. Yet six years later, the dramatic
and wide-ranging consequences of foreign access to what was conventionally called emerging markets domestic debt are indisputable, while
any expectation that foreign and domestic investors in domestic-law
debt would get equal treatment in crisis looks increasingly naive.
Several years later, Argentina's example would show that even foreign
law offers limited assurance of equal treatment to foreign and domestic
holders of the same instruments.
III.

BORN-AGAIN BODEN: FINANCIAL CRISIS TRANSFORMS A DEBT STOCK

The Russian crisis showed the world that domestic debt can have
global significance and that a government in trouble does not shrink
from treating domestic and foreign creditors differently with little
regard for the instruments they hold. Argentina went a step further by
demonstrating the wide discretion and creativity governments may
deploy in unilaterally refashioning their debt stocks to accommodate
their political and financing needs. And again, the legal features of the
government's debt instruments did not appear to constrain its crisis
management strategy.

35. IMF, Russian Federation,supranote 12, at 88.
36. Of course, unless the government was willing to stick its taxpayers with the bailout bill,
the need for funds to recapitalize the banks would have made the debt restructuring terms
marginally worse, ultimately penalizing the foreign investors. The key point is that handouts for
domestic constituencies would have been dispensed outside, not through, the debt exchange.
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In the 1990s, Argentina had become a model of financial openness
and innovation. The invention was born of necessity: Argentina desperately needed foreign capital to finance chronic budget deficits and pay
for imports that far outpaced its exports, owing to an overvalued
currency. 37 To meet the demand for financing, the government raised
money in multiple countries and currencies, selling bonds to U.S.
banks, Italian retirees, and Japanese households. Through the 1990s,
the government placed more and more foreign-law, foreign-currency
bonds with domestic financial institutions. 38 After Brazil-Argentina's
biggest trading partner and competitor- devalued its currency in
1998, Argentina sank into deeper recession. Foreigners began to balk
at lending to Argentina. As a result, after 1999, the government grew
even more dependent on domestic institutions.3 9 As Argentina slipped
into a deeper crisis during 2000, close to half of the government's debt
was in the hands of local banks and pension funds, many of which were
owned by large U.S. and European institutions.40
In November 2001, after a failed attempt to reprofile its debt in an
external bond exchange the previous summer, Argentina launched a
more innovative operation. The government asked domestic financial
institutions to tender their foreign-law, foreign-currency bonds in
exchange for slightly longer-term Argentine-law, dollar-denominated
loans notionally backed by revenue streams from the government's
new financial transactions tax. In return for this enhancement (and in
practice to avoid default), the coupon on the new instrument was
effectively reduced by 30%, to 7%.41 The exchange was uniquely

attractive to domestic institutions. Argentine banks and pension funds

37. See MICHAEL MUSSA,

INST. FOR INT'L ECON., POLICY ANALYSES

IN INT'L ECON. No. 67,

ARGENTINA AND THE FUND 9-17 (2002); Brad Setser & Anna Gelpern, Pathways Through Financial
Crisis: Argentina 14-15 (June 11, 2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors, prepared
for the Global Economic Governance Programme, University College, Oxford).
38. See MussA, supra note 37, at 16; INT'L MONETARY FUND, LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS IN
ARGENTINA 26 (Oct. 8, 2003) [hereinafter IMF, LESSONS], http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/
lessons/ 100803.pdf.
39. Guillermo Perry and Luis Serv6n, The Anatomy of a Multiple Crisis: Why Was Argentina

Specialand What Can We Learnfrom It47 (Apr. 2003), at http://www.worldbank.org/research/bios/
lse rven/Argentina% 20041703.pdf.
40. Daniel Marx, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Upcoming Case of Argentina 14 (Mar. 2003),
availableat http://www.rbwf.org/2003/Madrid/Marx.pdf; Setser & Gelpern, supra note 37, at 9.
41. IMF, LESSONS, supra note 38, at 61; Domingo Cavallo, Argentinean Tragedy, Address
Before the National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University (July 17, 2002), at
http://www.nber.org/-confer/2002/argentinaO2/cavallodinnerOOl .pdf; Tim Loughran, Argentina'sDebt Swap Snags on ProvincialLoans, DOWJONEs NEWSWIRES, Nov. 27, 2001.
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could value the new instrument at par, not at its market price. On the
other hand, foreign investors, mindful of the lessons Russia taught, did
not want an instrument governed by domestic law, particularly an
instrument structured as a loan rather than a bond. Nearly all of the
foreign-currency, foreign-law bonds held by Argentine financial institutions (though not all the bonds that were held by individual Argentines) were tendered in the exchange. 4 2 Just over a month later, in

December 2001, the government defaulted on the remainder of its
external bonds, which were now held overwhelmingly by foreign
residents. At the same time, the Argentine peso, which had been
pegged to the U.S. dollar at the rate of 1:1, was allowed to float and lost
nearly three quarters of its value within a few months.4 3
Far from ending the transformation of Argentina's debt stock, the
default sped it up. In the early months of 2002, the government issued
decrees that redenominated Argentine-law contracts into pesos at
subsidized rates. 44 In the process, the dollar-denominated domestic-law
loans that emerged from the November swap were converted into pesos
and lost the collateral feature. 4 5 Argentine pension funds, with the
exception of the fund managed by state-owned Banco Naci6n, challenged the move. More than a year later, the private pension funds that
refused to go along with the peso conversion were punished: the
government canceled their guaranteed loans and reinstated their
holdings of defaulted bonds. 46 The state-owned pension fund and
certain Argentine banks continued to hold tens of billions of dollars in
peso-denominated loans. These instruments lost value in the peso
conversion, but continued to be serviced in local currency.
After segregating certain domestic bondholders into restructured

42. See IMF, LESSONS, supranote 38, at 61.

43. See, e.g., Fernando J. Losada, Argentina: The Economy and the Elections, EMERGING MARKETS
FORT. (ABN AMRO, Neth.), Feb. 19, 2003, at 21, 25. For background, see MUSSA, supranote 37, at
49-55.
44. M. & M. Bomchil Abogados, PublicEmergency andForeignExchange System Reform Act, LEGAL
UPDATES FROM ARGENTINA, Jan. 2002, available at http://www.bomchil.com.ar/cas/novedades/
Public%20emergency%20and%20foreing%20exchange%20system%20reform%20act.htm; M. &
M. Bomchil Abogados, Financial System Restructuring, LEGAL UPDATES FROM ARGENTINA, Feb. 2002,
available at http://www.bomchil.com.ar/cas/novedades/Financial%20system%20restructuring.htm.
45. See Rafael Rofman, The Pension System and the Crisis in Argentina: Learningthe Lessons 12-14,
World Bank (2002), availableat http://www.brandeis.edu/global/rosenberg-papers/rofman-paper.pdf. At the time of the writing, Rofman was an officer of the state-owned Naci6n pension fund.
46. See Hewitt Associates, Impact ofArgentina'sEconomic Crisison PrivatePensionPlans (Sept.
2003), at http://was4.hewitt.com/hewitt/resource/legislative-updates/latin-america/
argentina_0903.htm.
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guaranteed loans and defaulting on external bondholders and domestic pension funds, Argentina needed to find still more ways to meet the
financial demands arising from its crisis. Foremost among these was the
imperative to inject capital into the domestic banking system, which
otherwise faced insolvency. The federal government also needed funds
to buy back scrip issued by provincial governments during the crisis. In
response, the government issued over $20 billion in new Boden bonds.
Most Boden were denominated in pesos, though a small portion were in
U.S. dollars.4 7 The government also assumed billions of dollars in
provincial debt as part of a general reform of its revenue-sharing
arrangements with the provinces (co-participation). All this new debt is
performing, and the government has pledged to exempt it from any
restructuring, effectively subordinating most foreign bondholders and
ensuring that holders of the new bonds and the guaranteed loans have
the first claim on the government's budget surplus.48
The result of Argentina's swap gymnastics was, in the first instance, to
transform a debt stock that was overwhelmingly foreign-law into a
bifurcated debt stock, with most of the politically protected domestic
constituencies holding local-law debt. The secondary market values of
the bonds still held by external creditors and private pension funds at
this writing hover around thirty cents on the dollar.49 The domestic
holders of these bonds who first swapped into the guaranteed loans
and then accepted the peso conversion came to hold instruments
worth closer to sixty cents on the dollar, although valuations are not
very reliable because the trading in some of the instruments is thin.5 °
Next came one of the more ironic twists of the Argentine debt saga.
The very foreign bondholders that had suffered the injury of default
and the insult of ex-post subordination began vying for the small
number of Boden trading in the secondary market. They-and Argentines looking for high-yielding investments-bid up the Boden price to
nearly seventy cents on the dollar, compared to thirty cents for the

47. Lacey Gallagher, Carola Sandy & Filippo Nencioni, Debt Restructuring: Past or Future,
CreditSuisseFirstBoston, Emerging Markets Economics: Argentina, Aug. 20, 2003, at 13; Martin
Anidjar, Argentina: PersistingEconomic and Political Uncertainty Does Not Justify Current Debt Prices,
JPMorgan Emerging Markets Research Strategy Report, Dec. 19, 2002, at 19-21.
48. See, e.g., Martin Anidjar & Anna Titarchuk, Argentina:Internationaland Domestic Tailwinds
Require an Update to Debt Restructuring Analyses, JPMorgan Emerging Markets Research Strategy

Report,July 18, 2003, at 10.
49. Deutsche Bank, Global Relative Value Research, Sovereign Debt Instruments-Prices at

Close, Aug. 18, 2004.
50. RouHINI & SETSER, BAILOUTS, supra note 16, at 272.
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defaulted foreign-law bonds of the same issuer.5" By most accounts,
only a few billion of the total has traded, because the principal holders
of the Boden, Argentine banks, are allowed to hold the debt on their
books at full face value and have no incentive to sell it at a discount.
Despite the fact that their own experience might lead them to doubt
the Argentine government's promise to repay, foreign investors believe
the government will stay current on the Boden because they are a key
asset of the domestic banking system. Unless the current holding
pattern for the bonds changes dramatically, investors are betting
against default 52 because it would threaten another bank run, antagonize Argentine depositors (who vote), and likely give rise to new fiscal
liabilities for another round of bank recapitalization. The strategy is
self-limiting: the calculus would reverse if foreign residents became the
predominant holders of the debt.
Finally, as Argentina is poised to restructure over $80 billion in
defaulted foreign-law, foreign-currency bonds, the holdings of private
domestic (but mostly foreign-owned) pension funds have emerged as a
key factor in the government's strategy. As the previous government
was running out of funding sources in the late 1990s, it pressured the
pension funds to buy more and more of its debt, with the result that
these institutions account for a significant share of the total debt in
default. 53 As noted earlier, the pension funds had initially swapped out
of their foreign-law bonds into Argentine-law loans, but were reinstated
in their holdings of defaulted bonds after refusing to accept peso
conversion for their loans. Pension funds are also in an awkward
political position: on the one hand, in the aftermath of pension
privatization in the mid-1990s, they hold some of the savings for
ordinary voting Argentines. On the other hand, the pension funds'
existing liabilities are largely long-term, and do not seem to have the
immediate and visceral political significance of bank deposits.
The current government is no friend of the private pension funds, a
project of the previous government that has been blamed by some for
helping get Argentina into its crisis. At the same time, the continued
inflows into the pension system are among the few potential sources of
financing available to the government. The government's financing
plan suggests that it intends to tap this resource to make payments on
the Boden and other effectively senior debt. It remains to be seen

51. Deutsche Bank, supranote 49.
52. Anidjar & Titarchuk, supranote 48.
53. Marx, supra note 40, at 6; see MUSSA, supra, note 37, at 26; Perry & Servn, supra note 39, at
47.
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whether the pension funds will use their holdings to band with foreign
bondholders, reach a regulatory side deal with the authorities to secure
a favorable accounting treatment of the exit instruments, or simply
succumb to government suasion and take whatever terms they are
offered.
In sum, the lessons of Argentina are threefold. First, the identity of
the creditor holding an instrument, be it an Argentine-law Boden or a
foreign-law bond, is important in assessing the risk of default and
restructuring. Domestic holders may do their government favors on
occasion and provide financing when others will not, but their cooperation comes at a price. Leaders who care about their popularity can ill
afford to stiff domestic creditors systematically: these creditors vote,
hold the savings of voters, and often have other means of influencing
the government that foreigners do not. Moreover, from the economic
balance of payments perspective, concessions to resident creditors
merely redistribute resources within the country-they do not produce
inflows or outflows. Concessions to non-residents produce outflows.
Second, both the Russian and Argentine crises show that governments are uniquely reluctant to impose punitive terms on debt held by
banks for fear of wiping out popular savings and shutting off credit to
the economy. Governments that do restructure such debt on a large
scale tend to recapitalize the banks to protect the financial system. In
this case, a dollar taken from Argentine bank capital would simply
become a liability of the government. Foreign investors appear to
appreciate the recapitalization imperative and recognize that formally
equal treatment in restructuring would bring them little economic
benefit: subsequent compensation to the banks would simply reduce
the resources available to pay foreign creditors.
The third lesson of Argentina's crisis is that sovereign debt stocks are
dynamic and flexible to the extent not understood before. Even where
a government is unwilling to resort to outright discrimination among
identical instruments based on who holds them (as Russia did in
restructuring the GKOs), the government can deploy voluntary and
involuntary debt exchanges to alter the holding pattern, governing law,
and even the currency of denomination of its debt. By shifting domestic
residents into a new instrument, the government can more easily offer
different restructuring terms to two sets of investors that once held the
same instrument.
Argentina's experience suggests that governments in emerging market economies know enough about the preferences of different creditor groups to take advantage of these differences. In crisis, they may use
regulatory and political suasion to change the legal composition of
2004]
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their debts to achieve the desired result. Foreign investors that express
surprise at these maneuvers may put more emphasis on formal legal
protections and pay less attention to the sovereign's overall economic
and political interests.
IV.

A RESTRUCTURING THAT WASN'T: DOMESTIC BANK HOLDINGS SPARE
4
5

ALL

On February 20, 2001, the Turkish government held an auction for
local-currency local-law Treasury bonds. It needed to refinance some
$6 billion in Treasury bonds coming due the next day and was willing to
offer bonds maturing a month later at an annual interest rate of 144%.
There were hardly any takers. In the next few days, overnight interest
rates shot up above 2,000%, and the government was forced to abandon the lira-dollar peg after losing $5 billion in reserves in three
chaotic days. This was Turkey's second financial crisis in less than six
months. Both crises had roots in the combination of a too-rigid
exchange rate and a government strapped for revenues that depended
on an overextended banking system for financing. In November 2000,
foreign banks began to pull short-term interbank deposits from their
Turkish counterparts, but the incipient run paused on the back of an
augmented IMF program. The reprieve proved short-lived. A public
spat between the president and the prime minister against the background of continued concerns with the banking sector triggered a run
55
on the currency that led to the collapse of the exchange rate regime.
The end of the peg resulted in large losses for the Turkish commercial banking sector, which had bet big on the lira.5 6 These losses came
on top of pre-existing losses in the state banks that had been obscured
with creative accounting.5 7 In response, foreign banks started pulling
their remaining credit lines, putting further pressure on the Turkish
58
banks and on the government debt market.

54. We are grateful to Eva Sanchez-Ampudia and Yarkin Cebeci ofJPMorgan for generously
sharing with us their data on Turkish debt.
55. Int'l Monetary Fund, Turkey: Sixth and Seventh Reviews Under the Stand-ByArrangement2-4, 7,
10, 12, 25, IMF Country Report No. 01/89 (June 2001) [hereinafter IMF, Turkey], http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2001/crO189.pdf.
56. Banks financed their investments in Turkish government lira Treasury bills with domestic
dollar deposits and cross-border interbank lines. ROUBINI & SETSER, BAILOUTS, supra note 16, at
65-66.
57. See IMF, Turkey, supra note 55, Staff Supplement: Foreign ExchangeExposures in the Banking
Sector 6.
58. IMF, Turkey, supranote 55, at 7.
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The government's liabilities then comprised mostly lira-denominated domestic-law debt totaling $55 billion, $35 billion of which was
held by the local banking system (including their off-balance sheet
holdings). 59 Turkey also owed $23 billion in dollar- and eurodenominated foreign-law bonds held by a mix of foreign investors,
expatriate Turks, and domestic banks. Since the government extended
a broad deposit guarantee in late 2000 and had long backed the state
banking system, the government was also sure to face additional bank
recapitalization costs that would add tens of billions of dollars to the
government's debt burden by the end of 2001. In fact, the dollar value
of Turkey's domestic-law, local-currency debt securities increased by
$30 billion, to $84.7, billion during the course of the year as high
interest rates and bank recapitalization costs added to the budget
deficit.60

After the collapse of the exchange rate peg, Turkey's leaders turned
to a new economic team led by Kemal Dervis, a veteran World Bank
official, for a new economic strategy. The new team faced a choice: they
could restructure some or all of the debt in an involuntary exchange,
print enough currency to meet the lira obligations (leading to an
inflation spiral), or shrink imports, boost revenues, and effectively
ration foreign exchange.
Like Russia and Argentina, Turkey sought to contain inflation. The
short-term structure of Turkey's lira debt made inflating away the debt
a difficult proposition. Meaningful debt relief would have likely required something close to hyperinflation, or dramatically extending
the maturities of domestically held debt. Moreover, printing money
would have eroded the real value of domestic Turkish savings (denominated in lira) while protecting the real value of foreign investors'
Eurobonds.
According to Dervis, the team had considered and rejected a coercive debt restructuring that would have lowered the real return on
Turkey's lira debt. 61 The fact that domestic banks, and through them
domestic depositors, held more than 50% of the domestic debt (and

59.

Id. at 44-45,

77-78; see also Eva Sanchez-Ampudia & Yarkin Cebeci, Turkey: Inward Focus

May Puncture Virtuous Circle,EMERGING MARKETS TODAY (JPMorgan, New York, N.Y.,June 4, 2004);

Sanchez-Ampudia & Yarkin Cebeci,JPMorgan Turkish Debt Data (2004) [hereinafterJPMorgan
Turkish Debt Data] (unpublished data, on file with authors).
60. Id.
61. Interview with Hon. Kemal Dervis, former Economy Minister of Turkey, in Oxford, Eng.,
(Apr. 30, 2004).
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probably as much as a quarter of Turkey's Eurobonds)6 2 was the
dominant factor in the decision. If the bulk of the debt had been held
by foreign investors or even expatriate Turks, the government may well
have opted for a coercive restructuring.
Rather than launch a coercive restructuring, Turkey undertook
massive fiscal adjustment (moving from a primary budget deficit of 2%
in 1999 to a surplus of 5.5% in 2001) and paid enormous real interest
rates (estimated at close to 50% in early 2001) to attract domestic
financing to roll over its short-term debt and finance the budget.
Turkey then saw its debt levels approach 100% of its GDP. 63 But even
the astronomical interest rates were not enough to attract all the
financing the government needed. To avert default, Turkey also received unprecedented
levels of financing from the IMF relative to the
64
size of its economy.

Turkey's experience reaffirms the critical place of creditor identity in
policymakers' decisions on crisis management. Having determined
that it was unwilling to restructure the bulk of its debt, the government
chose not to restructure any. Most of its local-currency, Turkish-law
debt was held by residents. Some of Turkey's foreign-currency foreignlaw debt was also in local hands. Therefore, a restructuring of foreigncurrency, foreign-law debt on punitive terms would have reduced
domestic confidence and might have made it difficult to refinance
local-currency, local-law debt. The fact that Turkey's harsh budget
measures were being used to pay domestic creditors no doubt also
made it more palatable politically.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Domestic debt is clearly much too important for countries' overall
financial position to remain outside the scope of policy action in crisis
management. Whether defined by currency, law, or residence of the
holder, domestic debt can be central to how a crisis proceeds inside the
country and its effects on the international financial system.6 5

62. JPMorgan Turkish Debt Data, supra note 59; Dervis interview, supra note 61.
63. WORLD BANK, Rep. No. 26301-TU, 2 TURKEY: COUNTRY ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM: TowARDs
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND SUSTAINED GRO~rH 2-4 (2003), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSIBankServlet?pcontr=details&eid=000160016_20030820162436.
64. IMF, Turkey, supranote 55, app. at 46.
65. For example, Brazil's domestic debt is nearly $300 billion and nearly seven times the size
of its external liabilities. InternationalBanking and FinancialMarket Developments: Statistical Annex,

BIS Q. REV. at A85, A92, tbl. 12D, 16A (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
rqa0403.pdf.
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It is not uncommon for countries to have legislation specifying that
domestic residents holding claims on an insolvent private debtor get
priority against non-residents during the distribution of the debtor's
assets. 6 6 For a sovereign, giving priority to domestic payments makes
economic sense. So long as residents do not take their foreign currency
out of the country, such payments merely redistribute resources within
the economy, from the government to the residents. Payments to
non-residents, however, create an outflow from the economy that can
ill-afford it in crisis. Favorable treatment for residents in debt restructuring makes even more sense if one considers the fact that domestic
residents suffer the brunt of economic contraction and currency
devaluation.6 v
Recent experience strongly suggests that countries may consider the
residence and identity of the creditor and currency of denomination
ahead of other factors when deciding how or even whether to default
or restructure. Even where the legal risks to the government are low, as
in domestic-law and domestic-currency obligations, 68 governments often choose to spare domestic holders, especially domestic banks. On
the other hand, investors should be cautious when trying to generalize
from one case to another: after all, Russia has successfully kept its
Eurobonds out of any restructuring.
Where local and foreign investors are both significant participants in
the issuer's foreign- law instruments (as in the case of Argentina's Euroand Global Bonds), the country may segregate different holders into
different debt instruments to gain crisis management flexibility. Argentina induced domestic residents to swap out of its Global Bonds and
created new privileged domestic-law debts, while seeking major concessions from its Global Bond holders. The legal documentation alone was
hardly determinative.
Turkey avoided restructuring altogether in part because domestic
banks dominated its debt stock. This meant that a restructuring would
have merely shifted a government liability from one category (debt
service) to another (bank recapitalization and more debt service), all at
an enormous political cost of alienating depositors and other voters.
The cases of both Turkey and Argentina suggest the advantage to
foreign investors of being minor players in a field effectively dominated

66. Buchheit & Pam, supra note 1, at 905, citing Emilio J. Cardenas, InternationalLending:
Subordinationof Foreign Claims Under Argentine Bankruptcy Law, in DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING 63

(David Suratgar ed., 1984).
67. ROUBINI & SETSER, BAILOUTS, supranote 16, at 265.
68. IMF, Sovereign Debt, supra note 4, at 15-16.
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by domestic banks investing the funds of politically vital domestic
depositors. On the other hand, governments that pack their financial
systems with their own debt may pose a higher risk of default. Moreover, the Russian case should caution against excessive reliance on
holding the same instrument as domestic banks: when truly pressed,
governments are quite capable of discriminating among holders even
without the intervening nicety of separating them into different instruments.
All this is not to say that equal treatment is impossible, merely that it
is increasingly rare. Mexico paid off all its creditors after receiving a $40
billion rescue package from the United States and the IMF in 1995.69
When Uruguay restructured its external bonds, it launched a simultaneous domestic exchange that was widely perceived as highly comparable to the international operation. It is significant that Uruguay's
exchange did not result in principal losses for participants, but merely
pushed out maturities across the board. 70 Few countries are able to
offer such terms in deep crisis.
These examples illustrate that approaches to sovereign debt restructuring that address only external-law bonds risk leaving open some of
the most crucial questions that arise in a crisis. On the other hand,
restricting sovereign authority over local-law, local-currency, or locally
held debt would eliminate important tools countries use to limit the
domestic economic dislocation associated with extreme financial crises. Developing more effective approaches to crisis resolution will
require looking seriously at the full gamut of debt instruments issued
by sovereigns, and searching for ways to balance a sovereign's legitimate desire to limit domestic dislocation with the international markets' desire for greater predictability.
Perhaps most importantly, recent experiences with domestic and
external debt offer an important lesson about the limits of financial
globalization. With the advent of globalization, domestic and foreign
investors can and do buy the same debt instruments. But this does not
mean that their political and economic interests have converged, or
that they have the same political and economic leverage with the
government. It should come as no surprise then that the two groups
rarely get equal treatment at the hands of a government that has run
out of money.

69. ROUBINI & SETSER, BAILOUTS, supra note 16, at 8.
70. Repfblica Oriental del Uruguay, Registration Statement Under Schedule B of the Securities Act

of 1933, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on April 10, 2003, availableat
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/102385/000O950123030040 7 1 /y 8 4 3 1lalsvbza.htm.
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